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It is proposed here that the archaeological evidence for the emergence of ‘modern behaviour’ 
(160,000–40,000 bp) can best be explained as the rise of cognitive variation within 
populations through social mechanisms for integrating ‘different minds’, rather than by the 
development of a single ‘modern human mind’. Autism and the autistic spectrum within 
human populations are used as an example of ‘different minds’ which when integrated within 
society can confer various selective benefits. It is proposed that social mechanisms for 
incorporating autistic difference are visible in the archaeological record and that these 
develop sporadically from 160,000 years bp in association with evidence for their 
consequences in terms of technological innovations, improved efficiency in technological and 
natural spheres and innovative thinking. Whilst other explanations for the emergence of 
modern human behaviour may also contribute to observed changes, it is argued that the 
incorporation of cognitive differences played a significant role in the technological, social and 







The appearance of modern human behaviour 
The appearance of what has been termed ‘modern human behaviour’ has been a key area of 
archaeological discussion for many years. ‘Modern’ behaviour is identified in the 
archaeological record through the appearance of new behavioural elements broadly 
associated with the spread of anatomically modern humans (Stringer 2002, Mellars 1989a, 
1989b, 1996, 1999, 2005, 2006, Hensilwood and Marean 2003), see table 1. Attention has 
particularly focused on technological/economic changes with the appearance of innovative, 
diverse and standardised flint tool technology (Mellars 1989a, 1989b, 1996, 2005, 2006, Bar-
Yosef 2002) widespread bone technology (Mithen 1996, Mellars 1989a, b, 1996, 2005, Bar-
Yosef 2002) and marine exploitation (Marean et al 2007) and on social/cognitive changes with 
the appearance of widespread evidence for the use of ochre (McBrearty and Brooks 2000, 
Marean 2007), art (Henshilwood et al 2001, Henshilwood and Marean 2003, Connard and 
Bolus 2003) elaborate burial (Mellars 1989a, 1989b, 1996, 1999) and long distance 
communication networks (Gamble 1999, Bar-Yosef 2002). The appearance of modern human 
behavioural traits is also associated with consequences within population dynamics and 
biology such as significant geographical expansion (Mellars 2006b,c), increases in longevity 
(Caspari and Lee 2006) and reductions in foraging stress (Kaufman 2001, Underdown 2006).  
Though there is broad agreement on the archaeological signatures of modern human 
behaviour (Hensilwood and Marean 2003, Mellars 2005, 2006a,b,c), its origins are variously 
seen as sudden and dramatic in their arrival (Mellars 2006c) or more slowly adopted 
(McBrearty and Brooks 2000, D’Errico et al 1998) and to variously exclude (Mellars 1989a, 
1989b, 1996, 1999, 2005, 2006b, c) or include (D’Errico et al 1998) archaic species such as 
Neanderthals.  
 
Modern human behaviour and key cognitive changes 
It has been tempting to search for one key cognitive change which might provide a full 
explanation for the rise of ‘modern’ behaviour through the appearance of the ‘modern human 
mind’.  Proposals for such a key change have included the fluid linkages of mental modules 
(Mithen 1995, 1996), development of modes of consciousness and trance states (Lewis-
Williams ref), advances in working memory (Wynn and Cooleridge 2004), the rise of the 
capacity for symbolic thought (Mellars 1989a, 1989b, 1996) or changes in the construction of 
identity (Gamble 2007). Such cognitive changes might theoretically have occurred in the small 
populations in Africa which gave rise to modern humans (Mellars 2005a, 2005b, 2006). 
‘Modern human behaviour’ would thus have spread with the progressive geographical 
expansion of biologically modern populations. Certainly elements of modern human behaviour 
are initially represented in Africa at about 100-160,000 years ago, around the time of the 
development of biologically modern human populations (Hensilwood and Marean 2003, 
Mellars 2006c, Marean et al 2007, Mellars 2007). MtDNA evidence further supports a 




years ago (Mellars 2006c, 2007) and ‘modern human behaviour’ also shows a marked 
development and contrast to that of Neanderthals when modern humans expand into Europe 
around 40-30,000 years ago.  
 
However, though attempts have been made to apply directly progressive models of 
behavioural changes (see Foley and Lahr 2003; Mellars 2006b,c) the archaeological record is 
complex and in many regions defies a simple ‘spread’ model. If there is no simple ‘spread’ of 
modern human behaviour the direct link to biology is called into question (Zilhão 2007). 
Behavioural changes are for example less abrupt or less marked in Asia where symbolic 
behaviour is not immediately expressed (James and Petraglia 2005) whilst in contrast modern 
symbolic behaviour and particularly the use of red ochre appears to arise much earlier than 
the posited origins of modern humans in Africa (McBrearty and Brooks 2000). In the Levant 
(Kaufman 2001, Shea 2003) modern humans are present without any significant behavioural 
change at 80,000 years ago and are subsequently replaced by Neanderthals. In Europe so 
called ‘transitional industries’ illustrate a capacity in Neanderthals for reproducing ‘modern’ 
behaviour in personal ornamentation and stone tool types (Harrold 1989, Hublin et al 1996, 
Mellars 1999, D’Errico et al 1998, Valoch 2000, Coolidge and Wynn 2004, Chase 2007). 
Various authors have suggested that the emergence of modern human behaviour had a 
significant social component, though the precise character of this remains elusive (Gamble 
2007, Zilhão 2007, Petitt 2007) and it is difficult to explain the progressive nature of modern 
human behavioural change. 
 
Significant questions  
Several questions remain. Despite evidence for significant behavioural changes on a large 
temporal and spatial scale, on a regional scale there is little absolute association between 
genetically modern humans, recorded in MtDNA evidence and anatomically in cranial and 
skeletal material, and ‘modern human behaviour’. Further research or interpretations appear 
to be needed. There is no clear ‘map’ between behavioural and biological changes or 
explanation for why large scale behavioural changes and population expansion occur 
significantly (approximately 100,000 years) later then the biological origin of modern humans, 
or the earliest evidence for such behaviour in the archaeological record. The nature and 
causes of ‘modern human behaviour’ has remained open to debate (Kuhn and Hovers 2006), 
with the situation complicated since the lack of material expression of behaviour cannot be 
seen as evidence for its absence, the so called ‘Sapient Paradox’ (Renfrew 2007: 79). 
Demographic changes have provided a recent key focus for explanations of the adoption of 
innovations (Shennan 2001, Hovers and Belfer-Cohen 2006), with larger and more stable 
populations more likely to adopt ‘inventions’ to become ‘innovations’ (Hovers and Belfer-
Cohen 2006) but these explanations still fail to explain why such demographic changes take 




structures underlying behaviour is perhaps the root cause of difficulties in understanding this 
key stage (Hensilwood and Marean 2003).  
 
Here it is argued that a key limitation to interpretations has been the assumption that modern 
humans can be characterised by a single ‘modern mind’ against which previous species might 
be compared. Much as there is no one single type of olfactory system that could be the ‘norm’ 
but instead a range of normal genetically coded variation in biology within populations (Weiss 
2007), there may be no single ‘normal’ mind but a range of interrelated variations. A model of 
the origins of modern human behaviour as based on cognitive differences, potentially 
maintained through social mechanisms, might provide a better explanation for many of the 
characteristics of the archaeological record.  
 
The autistic spectrum is used as an example of cognitive differences within populations which, 
through their integration within society, might play a significant role in the emergence of 





Autism and the prehistory of cognitive differences 
 
Autism as a significant ‘difference in mind’ 
Amongst cognitive based differences in ‘mind’, autism and autistic differences are particularly 
relevant to the question of cognitive differences and modern human behaviour. Although 
autism was once seen as a rare and poorly understood ‘disorder’, there have been significant 
advances in our understanding of the condition in recent years (Baron-Cohen 2006a; 2006b, 
Baird et al 2006, Grinker 2007). Whilst archaeology as a discipline is only beginning to take 
up the challenge of autism and population differences in cognition the potential role and 
significance to society of autistic conditions is increasingly clear. 
 
The significance of autism has potentially been overlooked due to a traditional emphasis on 
autism as a severe disorder associated with extreme behaviour. Whilst the talents of autistic 
‘savants’, such as ‘Nadia’ who had extraordinary drawing abilities despite almost no language 
(Selfe 1977, Treffert 1989)  attract attention, these individuals are not only very rare but also 
clearly outside ‘society’ particularly given their inabilities to communicate effectively with 
others. Indeed the diagnostic criteria for autism reflect a focus on extreme and antisocial 
behaviour (table 2). In recent years however there has been an increasing focus on other 
autistic conditions, in particular Asperger’s Syndrome, which, whilst denoting a clear 
difference in ‘mind’ do not necessarily involve any significant social exclusion. The key 
significant different between Asperger’s Syndrome and classic autism is that these individuals 
can use language effectively (table 2) often being relatively successful in society with their 
‘difference’ even other unrecognised until later life (Griffin 2006, Attwood 1998). Whilst those 
with Asperger’s Syndrome share difficulties in empathising (feeling an appropriate emotion in 
relation to another’s emotion, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004) with those with autism 
they may be socially competent, and able to predict behaviour, using a rule based method of 
socialising which nonetheless often ‘works’ (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004, Attwood 
1998: 114, Baron-Cohen 2006a, 2006b). Consequently these individuals think ‘differently’ but 
may not behave in an extremely different way to others as they can learn (and discuss) what 
is ‘acceptable’ as rules (Baron-Cohen 2000; Molley and Vasil 2002) even if they lack the 
emotional understanding of other people which depends on empathising with another’s 
emotions. 
 
Temple Grandin, professor of animal behaviour, provides a useful example of the level of 
effective integration within society which those with autistic conditions can play (Grandin 1995; 
Grandin and Johnson 2006). With marked language delays and inability to empathise with 
others she was diagnosed with severe autism in childhood. Through language therapy her 
communication skill later developed such that she is a leading author, with regular 
contributions to Science and Nature – effectively becoming someone with Asperger’s 






Several of the features of ‘milder’ autistic conditions such as Asperger’s have been linked to 
areas of particularly ‘brilliance’ or achievement (table 4) (Fitzgerald 2003; 2005, Fitzgerald 
and Walker 2006, Fitzgerald and O’Brien 2007, Ortiz 2008).  It is not difficult to see how 
attention to detail, exceptional memory, a thirst for knowledge and narrow obsessive focus 
can lead to significant achievement in certain realms, particularly when often coupled with a 
desire for social isolation, a ‘turning away from everyday things’, a motivation for achievement 
in the advancement of knowledge and a unique single-mindedness even in the context of 
another’s distress. Indeed those with Asperger’s Syndrome typically have excellent abilities at 
understanding largely predictable systems such as engineering or computers, or the weather 
(Hermelin 2002, Baron-Cohen et al 2000) and often show an extraordinarily sophisticated 
understanding of complex predictable systems (Myers et al. 2004, O’Riordan et al 2001, 
Plaisted et al 1998). Their abilities to identify laws or patterns in complex data also give 
capacities for much original insight (Baron-Cohen 2006b: 4). Those with Asperger’s 
Syndrome may be playing an important role within society. 
 
The prevalence of autistic conditions in populations 
The prevalence of autistic conditions has recently been appreciated more clearly. Of course 
given the different definitions and understandings of the condition the rates of what is classed 
as ‘autistic’ vary. Some authors place figures of those with autistic conditions as around 1% 
(Wing 1981), in broad agreement with diagnosis rates based on strictly defined behavioural 
diagnostic criteria for autistic conditions in the UK from the Office of National Statistics figure 
of 0.9% (Williams, Higgins and Bryne 2005) and recent wide scale medical studies of 1.2% 
(Baird et al 2006). However research by Baron-Cohen based on differences in cognitive style 
would place the autistic extreme of ‘mind’ in the UK at around 2% (Baron-Cohen 2004, Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright 2004: 169). Different definitions of autism may give subtly different 
‘rates’ (with rather higher rates if based on cognition rather than behaviour) but there is overall 
agreement on the persistent presence of numbers of autistic people within the population, and 
perhaps most significantly broad inter population agreements in rates across other 
populations (Wakabayashi et al 2006). 
 
The cognitive basis of autism 
Those with autistic conditions clearly ‘think differently’ from others. There are different 
theories as to the neurological basis of autism, such as deriving from under-functioning of 
mirror neurones  (Williams et al 2001) or differences in higher level neural connections (Just 
et al 2007). However in functional terms, autism is traditionally associated with cognitively 
based deficiencies in ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM). Theory of Mind is the ability to conceive of 
other’s intentions and beliefs. People may have differing abilities at understanding others, 




of others about the beliefs of others etc) (Dunbar 2003; 2007, Mithen 1996). However whilst 
autism is associated with low levels of Theory of Mind abilities (Dunbar 2003, Baron-Cohen 
and Belmont 2005, Burns 2004, 2006), and understanding of intentionality, those with 
Asperger’s Syndrome may often pass Theory of Mind tests by using rules and logic about 
other’s beliefs (Baron-Cohen 2000; Molley and Vasil 2002). Indeed such ‘rules’ appear to be 
sufficient to allow them to cope in most social interactions. However autistic conditions are 
nonetheless a disadvantage in certain areas of social relationships. Indeed attention has 
focused recently on inabilities of those with autistic conditions to empathise with others (feel a 
feeling appropriate to another’s feeling, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004) and so to 
conceive of other’s emotional states (Salani et al 2007). Whilst Theory of Mind (other’s beliefs) 
abilities are reduced, it is the abilities to understand other’s emotions which are most 
significant in affecting the social relationships of those within autism.  
 
Autism in social relationships 
Despite advantages in certain domains, conditions such as Asperger’s Syndrome are 
generally a disadvantage in intimate social relationships. The ‘something’ missing in autism is 
the empathetic ability to relate to others emotions, to develop emotional rapport, and to 
compassionately invest in another’s wellbeing and feelings (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
2004, Baron-Cohen 2002, 2004, Salani et al 2007). Empathy and emotional rapport are key to 
social relationships. Indeed it is empathy, largely missing in those with autistic conditions, 
which ‘provides the glue which holds society together’ (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004: 
163). Emotional rapport, and reciprocal emotional exchanges form a crucial component of 
almost all areas of intimate social life. Emotional rapport is essential to child development, 
forming the basis for cognitive development and secure relationships in later life (Evans 2001, 
Greenspan and Shanker 2004, Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 2005, Gross 2006, 
Goleman 2006, Grieser and Kuhl 1998; Jaffe et al 2001, Falk 2005). Emotional rapport and 
the emotions based on interpersonal emotional reactions (or social or socio-moral emotions, 
Damasio 2000, Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 2005) are also the basis for strong social 
bonds in adulthood. It is socio-moral emotions based on empathising such as love, remorse 
and compassion which provide the close social ties that link people together (Batson 1991, 
Berg, Dickhait and McCabe 1995, Frank 1998; 2001, Nesse 2001, Fiske 2002, Gintis et al 
2003, Tuckler, Luu and Derryberry 2005) and form the basis for altruistic acts. Through 
empathising with others, or the group, and integrating these emotions with rational thought we 
routinely act on behalf of others even at our own cost (Frank 2001, Nesse 2001, Mukulincer 
and Shaver 2005, deWaal 2008), something alien to the predominantly self-regarding social 
relationships of our nearest relatives the chimpanzees (Jenson et al 2006). Indeed, an 
emotional investment in other’s wellbeing originating in the fleeting compassion of higher 
primates (deWaal 2008) appears to have a long history, from around 1.5 million years ago 




much larger scale investments, even extending over many years in caring for the injured and 
infirm in Neanderthals (Spikins and Rutherford in prep).  
 
Those with Asperger’s Syndrome function significantly differently within social relationships on 
two counts. Firstly they fail to interpret complex dynamic emotional signals, the rapid and 
empathetic chit-chat, gossip and humour of everyday life. Temple Grandin, illustrates this 
relationship particularly well. Temple is someone with an autistic mind who plays an important 
role in ‘society’ but remains outside, though nonetheless able to glimpse, the complex web of 
dynamic and rhythmic interpersonal emotions. She remarks 
 
During the last couple of years I have become more aware of a kind of electricity that goes on 
between people. I have observed that when several people are together and having a good 
time their speech and laughter follow a rhythm. They will all laugh together then talk quietly 
until the next laughing cycle. I have always had a hard time fitting in with this rhythm, and I 
usually interrupt conversations without realising my mistake. The problem is that I can’t follow 
the rhythm (Grandin 1995: 91-91). 
 
Secondly those with Asperger’s Syndrome can be motivated by different goals than others, 
and Fitzgerald and O’Brien (2007: 5) note that they ‘get their psychological highs on their 
breakthroughs in creative understanding’. Like those which attachment insecurities 
(Mukilincer and Shaver 2005) they don’t form part of the web of emotional commitment and 
‘caring’ for others, which ‘feels good’ for those who act compassionately (Tuckler, Luu and 
Derryberry 2005). Indeed, one of the key characteristics for diagnosing historical figures with 
Asperger’s Syndrome has been a failure to take action to care for or protect ill or infirm 
spouses of children where no clear ‘rules’ exist to proscribe this (Fitzgerald 2005) and 
Gernsbacher, Dawson and Mottron (2006: 414) illustrate the differing emotional motivations 
and drive for achievement of those with autism with a quote from the famous inventor Nikola 
Tesla.  
 
I do not think that there is any thrill that can go through the human heart like that felt by the 
inventor as he sees some creation of the brain unfolding to success… Such emotions make a 
man forget food, sleep, friends, love, everything… I do not think you can name many great 
inventions made by married men. (Pickover 1999: 35).  
 
Life as a ‘high functioning’ autistic person within society can appear as if living in a different 
culture, which Sacks (1995) describes as being ‘An Anthropologist on Mars’.  
 
The social roles of those with autistic conditions 
It is not only the talents of those with Asperger’s Syndrome, but also their motivations which 




and ‘turning away’ from social relationships towards a particular focused special interest for 
example can be the basis for significant advances in the arts and sciences (Fitzgerald 2003; 
2005, Baron-Cohen 2006a; 2006b). Indeed, the social roles developed by those with autistic 
conditions are becoming an important subject of debate (Fitzgerald 2003; 2005, Griffin 2006, 
Baron-Cohen et al 1997; 1998, Baron-Cohen 2002, 2004, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
2004, James 2006, Fitzgerald and O’Brien 2007). Unsurprisingly those with autism seem to 
naturally be drawn to certain social spheres or positions such as in academia, engineering 
and computer scientists (Baron-Cohen et al 1997; 1998)and politics (Griffin 2006, Fitzgerald 
and Walker 2006, Fitzgerald and O’Brien 2007). Many individuals associated with key political 
roles or significant scientific, artistic or philosophical achievement have been interpreted as 
having Asperger’s Syndrome (Attwood 1998, Fitzgerald 1999, 2003, 2005, Fitzgerald and 
Walker 2006, Fitzgerald and O’Brien 2007, Grandin 1995, Snyder 2004, Sacks 2004, James 
2003, 2006, Bottomer 2007), including key historical figures such as Charles Richter, Albert 
Einstein, Charles Darwin, Isaac Newton, Hans Christian Andersen, Lewis Carroll, Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart, Vincent Van Gogh, Eamon de Valera and Sir Keith Joseph (Fitzgerald 2002, 
2003, 2005, Fitzgerald and Walker 2006, Fitzgerald and O’Brien 2007, Hough 2007). Hans 
Asperger commented that ‘It seems for success in science or art, a dash of autism is 
essential. For success the necessary ingredient may be to turn away from the everyday world, 
from the simply practical, an ability to re-think a subject with originality so as to create new 
untrodden ways, with all abilities canalised into the one speciality’ (Asperger 1979: 49) cited in 
Attwood (1998: 27). 
  
We can reasonably speculate that analogous social roles for those who were ‘different’ also 
existed in the past. Though there have not been any explicit studies of autism in 
ethnographically documented societies it is not difficult to see how such people might play a 
role in early small scale societies. ‘Difference’ in mind is often accepted and may generate 
particular social roles in small scale communities (Porr and Alt 2006). In ethnographically 
documented hunter-gatherers status and respect may be aided by autistic traits such as a 
unique understanding of technology and natural systems and unique focus (such as a 
particular proficiency in hunting or in creating precision or complex technology). Amongst the 
Selk’nam for example a solitary hunter, particularly specialised in hunting cormorants 
achieved a certain notable status (Bridges 1948). Social roles for difficult or controlling people 
also exist, for example amongst the !Kung who use such individuals to negotiate with other 
groups (Lee 1979). At points of stress where it may not be useful to empathise with others 
distress humble leaders (who are normally preferred in egalitarian societies, Boehm 1993) 
may be replaced by dominant or controlling ‘war leaders’ perhaps more suited to organising 
behaviour forcibly (Van Vugt and De Cremer 2002; Van Vugt 2006: 363, Boehm 1993: 233). 
Clear difference in mind in itself may also generate particular spiritual status (Carod-Artal and 





Selection of those with autistic traits 
The situational success of autistic conditions also provide an explanation for their 
maintenance in populations. Autistic conditions are highly heritable (Folstein and Rutter 1977; 
Bolton and Rutter 1990; Bailey et al 1995; Bailey et al 1998; Folstein and Rutter 1988; 
Gillberg 1991; Baron-Cohen 1997; 1998, Lamb et al 2000, Molden and Rubenstein 2006, 
Alarcón et al 2008) and Baron-Cohen (2006a; 2006b) for example suggests that preferential 
mating between ‘like minded’ peoples with expressions of Aspergers’s Syndrome may be 
maintaining autism and generating more extreme forms in their children. Baron-Cohen’s 
‘assortative mating’ theory is supported by evidence of high rates of autism amongst 
engineers and within families of engineers and those working in information technology 
(Baron-Cohen et al 1997; 1998) and geographic ‘hotspots’ of diagnosed severe autism at 
Cambridge, MIT and Stamford. Alternatively particularly nurturing individuals may be attracted 
by autistic differences (Attwood 2003, Rodman 2003). Relatively common conditions such as 
attachment insecurities in development which can constrain abilities to make emotional 
commitments to others in later life (Mukuliner and Shaver 2005) can make the ‘fairness’ of 
those with autism attractive partners for some (Rodman 2003), plus the potential arenas for 
success and achievement for those people those with ‘a dash of autism’ may also make their 
social status attractive. Autism, as a condition which is common, heritable and not necessarily 
harmful, even sometimes advantageous (Gernsbacher, Dawson and Mottron 2006) may be 
being maintained in populations through diverse means. 
 
Autistic conditions in evolutionary perspective 
From an evolutionary perspective there may be something particularly significant about 
autistic individuals. Rejman (2005) sees autism as key to human societies, and in reference to 
the potential role of autism in human evolution quotes G. B. Shaw as saying ‘The reasonable 
man adapts himself to the world. The unreasonable man tries to adapt the world to himself. 
Therefore all progress depends upon the unreasonable man.’ Fitzgerald even boldy remarks 
that ‘All human evolution was driven by slightly autistic Asperger’s and autistic people. The 
human race would still be sitting around in caves chattering to each other if it were not for 
them’ (quoted in Griffin 2006: 27). Autism, and indeed other genetically based cognitive 
differences, might not be as peripheral to the origins and maintenance of ‘modern human 
behaviour’ as we might traditionally expect. Although our conscious concept of our own mind 
as a model for other’s (Humphrey 1984 can make conceiving of widespread autistic 
conditions in society challenging, ‘mild’ autistic conditions such as Asperger’s Syndrome are 
clearly something we as archaeologists need to take into account in interpretation of 





Autism in Prehistory 
A knowledge of the situational advantages of autistic conditions and roles of individuals with 
these conditions can shed insight on key features of the archaeological record, and 
developments around the Middle-Upper Palaeolithic transition in particular. 
 
One area of early Prehistory which has attracted particular attention within discussions of 
autism is that of the Upper Paleolithic cave art of south-west Europe. Humphrey (1998) 
highlights key similarities between such art and the drawings of Nadia, an autistic ‘savant’ 
who had virtually no command of language but exceptional drawing ability, and Kellman 
(1998) draws similar analogies between such art and ‘Jamie’ a similarly talented autistic 
‘savant’ (Kellman 1998). The similarities are apparently significant, with both art forms 
showing unusual attention to precise details, exceptional memory abilities and a very literal 
(rather than metaphorical) rendition of the world. Humphrey concludes that the only 
explanation may be that the Upper Palaeolithic artists indeed shared cognitive similarities with 
Nadia, such as a literal view of the world, and may not have had in that case truly ‘modern’ 
minds. This explanation for the similarities is seen as problematic (Bahn 1998) and certainly is 
difficult to reconcile with other elements of the archaeological record, such as symbolic burial 
and personal ornamentation which occur much earlier and are generally interpreted in terms 
of complex symbolic thought (Mithen 1998b, Tattersall 1998). A further argument against 
such an interpretation is that even much earlier ‘art’ such as a Blombos Cave (Henshilwood et 
al 2002a, 2002b, 2004)  is not in the precisely realistic style found in south-west Europe but 
demonstrates an understanding of symbolic, rather than purely literal, thought.  
 
Trehin (2002, 2003) in contrast concludes that the similarities in such Palaeolithic art to that of 
austistic savants provides evidence that the art was made my autistic savants themselves  
and stresses the role of such individuals in human evolution. This is equally problematic as an 
interpretation however and fails to explain the ubiquitousness of this art form, particularly 
given similarities between parietal and mobiliary art (Bahn and Vertut 1997) and the continuity 
of art despite apparent rareness of savants with artistic genius, particularly within small scale 
Palaeolithic populations .  
 
An understanding of the characteristics, prevalence and social roles of those with Asperger’s 
Syndrome however illustrates that there is no need to recourse to either explanation. Those 
with Asperger’s Syndrome share cognitive tendencies such as an attention to detail, 
exceptional memory and precise replication with those with more ‘severe’ (socially debilitating) 
forms of autism. Not only is Asperger’s Syndrome more common, but we know that these 
linguistic competent individuals are very influential in the spread of their ideas. Few would 
doubt the influence of figures such as Einstein, Darwin, Newton, Van Gogh or Mozart, 
apparently with Asperger’s Syndrome, on science or the arts, and indeed Temple Grandin 




(Grandin and Johnson 2006). Those with Asperger’s Syndrome clearly have an influence on 
ideas and ways of seeing things. Indeed people living in close relationships with those with 
Asperger’s Syndrome are also known to develop ‘autistic thinking’ (Aston 2001) and it is not 
difficult to see that influential people with Asperger’s can be the hub of a spread not only of 
ideas, inventions, concepts but more profoundly of ways of thought. We are after all in 
modern society able to think ‘autistically’ or in purely rule based and analytical terms, and are 
explicitly thought such thinking styles through our system of education. That is not to say the 
influence of those with Asperger’s Syndrome worked in the same manner in early prehistoric 
societies as in our own nonetheless. The nature of Upper Palaeolithic art may indeed provide 
evidence for the form of transmission of visual ideas, with Haworth (1998) suggesting that 
Upper Palaeolithic language was more visually based, powerfully focusing and disseminating 
thought on visual representation. 
 
Upper Palaeolithic art in south-west Europe may have drawn particular attention in relation to 
traits of autism but it is not unique in demonstrating ‘autistic’ thinking. Indeed other elements 
of the archaeological record might display similarly surprising attention to detail, and absolute 
replication as Palaeolithic art – most notably precise, detailed and standardised technology 
such as microblade industries at Howiesoon’s Poort (Wurtz 1999, Henshilwood et al 2001, 
Mellars 2006b, 2007). Rather than evidence for a lack of modern minds these developments 
are perhaps rather more evidence of the emergence of cognitive modernity as cognitive 
differences in mind within populations. Indeed if, like many researchers, we view modern 
human cognitive differences as a spectrum of difference of which the autistic spectrum is only 
one element (Baron-Cohen 2002, 2004, 2006b, Crespi 2006, Nettle 2005, 2006b), we can 
see the technological innovations of the Middle-Upper Palaeolithic transition as evidence for 
the rise of this characteristic ‘spectrum’ and the activities and influence of the ‘technologically 
minded’ on society.  
 
Viewed with an understanding of the social role of autistic conditions it is difficult to escape 
the relationship between the ‘package of developments’ (Mellars 2007: 5) in Africa associated 
with the emergence of modern humans, and the focus on systems, precision and 
technological order seen in Asperger’s Syndrome and in those with a more ‘technologically 
minded’ personality.  From some of the earliest industries associated with this transition we 
the emergence of precision working, particularly within microlithic industries such as those of 
Howiesoon’s Poort (Wurtz 1999, Henshilwood et al 2001), as well as clear attention to detail 
and adherence to strict rules in the new levels of standardisation of artefact forms (Mellars 
2006b, 2007). In terms of rigidly analytical thinking we also see the emergence of a new 
efficiency in tools, and the use of ‘engineered’ solutions such as projectile weapons (Shea 
2003) and more efficient use of blade technology (Mellars 2006, Shea 2003). Such improved 
efficiencies contribute to reductions in resource stress (Kaufman 2001, Underdown 2006). 




structured notation systems (Marshack 1991, Robinson 1992). Moreover, perhaps most 
tellingly evidence for a range of ‘different thinking’ comes from the emergence of the 
applications of significant insights, and a new rapidity in innovation and willingness to ‘break 
with the norm’ (Hovers and Belfer-Cohen 2006). The significance of the ‘human revolution’ 
may be as a revolution captured in differences within society, rather than primarily a 
revolution between any single mind and what came before.  
 
Can we therefore accredit the technological changes, and the ‘success’ of modern humans to 
the rise of autistic thinking? This would perhaps be simplistic. It might rather be argued that 
social changes allowed those who were ‘different’ to be incorporated into society, and their 




Autism and the social integration of difference 
 
The key to the role of autism in the emergence of modern human behaviour may be argued to 
lie, not in autistic individuals themselves, but in the cultural mechanisms which allow their 
integration. It is, after all, ‘culture’ and most particularly the structure of language, which 
dictates that Einstein is merely talented and ‘eccentric’ whereas Nadia, unable to 
communicate effectively with language was talented but ‘disordered’. Indeed from this 
perspective we can begin to at least speculate that several social mechanisms within cultures 
could have developed in a form and structure which allows the ‘integration of difference’ and 
formed a bridge between different minds.  
 
Language.  
Language appears to be particularly important in integrating those with Asperger’s Syndrome 
in society. Language provides the ‘codification’ which both structures and ‘codes’ meaning, 
and gives a permanence to understandings which have a commonality across different minds. 
As Baron-Cohen illustrates language ability is the key threshold dividing socially functioning 
individuals with ‘Asperger’s Syndrome’ from those with ‘autism’ (Baron-Cohen 2006a, see 
also Attwood 1998, 2006), as shown in the diagnostic criteria (table 2 & 3). In this context, 
whilst Temple Grandin cannot understand dynamic empathetic social interactions she is more 
than capable of communicating her ideas and opinions (including on her inability to 
understand complex emotional exchanges) through our common understanding of structured 
language. Language is by no means perfect in communicating between different minds, and 
misunderstandings of meaning (particularly in relation to subtle emotional expression) often 
occur with those with Asperger’s Syndrome. These misunderstandings can normally be 
explained nonetheless (a dictionary providing Asperger interpretations of common phrases 
even exists, Stuart-Hamilton 2006). Language can, in a sense, solves even the 
misunderstanding created through its use.  
 
Symbolic material culture 
‘Language’ of course extends beyond spoken words and text. As archaeologists are acutely 
aware, material culture and material symbolism works in a way which is analogous to 
language (Hodder 1989, Tilley 1991). In all cultures ‘codes’ of dress and adornment exist and 
rule based systems of material culture ‘code’ meaning in material objects in similar ways to 
spoken language or text. Clear material symbols (such as wedding rings) function to explicitly 
codify emotional relationships and in doing so make them understandable and readable to 
autistic minds. Subtle material meanings may be lost on certain minds (or their ambiguity 
exploited by others, Tilley 1991) but nonetheless the key communication and facility for 
collaboration is made. Language and material symbolism both clearly ‘work’ in making 
collaboration and communication across different minds possible. As Attwood (2003) 




Asperger’s Syndrome and their neurotypical partners, different meanings can and do work to 
ensure communication and collaboration.  
 
Rules to govern relationships outside of emotional attachments 
There may also be social mechanisms which help those with autism navigate social 
relationships. Fiske also points to the role of universal structures to social relationships and 
rules of social contracts shared by both modern societies and ethnographically documented 
groups (Fiske 1991, 2002). Beyond close altruistic relationships for example he points to a 
sphere of ‘tit-for-tat’ relationships which characterise less close social connections, and 
potentially provide a structure for relating to autistic ‘fairness’ (Fiske 1991, 2002). Further 
research might clarify other rule based social mechanisms which forge effective 
communication and collaborations between the analytical and the emotional world of different 
minds.  
 
Social facilities to accommodate difference and social tensions 
Whatever the advantages of integrating autistic minds, the behavioural traits associated with 
autism (table 2 & 3), such as single mindedness, a lack of concern with social norms, 
egocentricity, or obsessive concerns with detail also create social tensions. Other social 
mechanisms identified as ‘modern human behaviour’ might also exist to promote social 
cohesion within groups pressurised by the integration of ‘different minds’. Mithen (2005) 
illustrates how performance and music provide a context in modern humans for collaboration, 
stemming from earlier origins, based on group and herd emotions and a feeling of well being 
through boundary loss. Involvement in communal dance and music clearly forges a sense of 
emotional wellbeing and trust which is also important for group cohesion. Equally individuals 
such as shaman, found universally in hunter-gatherer groups (Aldhouse-Green and Aldhouse-
Green 2005) and perhaps with a particularly empathetic or socially orientated personality, 
may arise to perform a key role in fostering social cohesion. Evidence for music, collaborative 
ritual (particularly with burial) and shamanic practices have been associated with ‘modern 
human behaviour’ (table 5). 
 
Certain spheres of social life may also provide a level of lawfulness and predictability which 
allows extreme systemisers to function ‘sheltered’ from the confusing intensity of dynamic 
empathetic interactions. It has been suggested that such spheres within modern society 
provide an environment in which those with Asperger’s Syndrome can thrive – with certain 
modern environments having high predictability, clear rules, little change and a low intensity 
or high rule base to social interaction, and in these spheres the areas of ability of extreme 
systemisers may make a valuable contribution. Griffin (2007) points to the legal system and 
academia, with Rodman commenting that ‘universities provide a sheltered workshop for 
autistic thinking’ (Rodman 2003). Certain individuals can also live rather sheltered and 




Selk’nam, Briggs 1948). A study of social dynamics in Mesolithic Europe supports the 
separation of different spheres, showing that while in the ‘emotional and social’ arena burial 
rites are intensely changeable, so changeable in fact that ‘anything goes’ and methods of 
burial defy any overall generalisation (Schulting 1998), in contrast technology (the area of 
mechanics and physical systems) remains remarkably constant in this period (Spikins in 
press). The more clearly structured living spaces characteristic of ‘modern human behaviour’ 
may provide one example of the rise of spatially differentiated spheres of social relationships, 
and the possibilities for certain individuals to isolate themselves from intense emotional or 
unpredictable activities whilst remaining within society (see table 5). 
 
Social controls on potentially antisocial behaviour 
Being ‘unreasonable’ may go beyond tolerance and accommodation and difficulties with 
social norms, an egocentric focus, and controlling or dominant behaviour may also present 
more serious threats to group autonomy. The ‘different’ and often difficult individual is always 
present in ethnographic accounts, not matter how strong an ideologically focus exists on 
collective wellbeing. Amongst the Inuit Briggs notes that tempestuous Niqi and dominant, 
egocentric dominating Inuttiaq were tolerated whilst their behaviour remained within certain 
limits for example (Briggs 1980). Tolerance of very different behaviour in small scale societies 
is typically broad (Carod-Artal and Vásquez Cabrera 2007), but never unlimited where 
antisocial behaviour is concerned, and ethnographic accounts also provide evidence of the 
type of mechanism which limit antisocial behaviour. Boehm (1993) studies in detail social 
dynamics which prevent dominance in hunter-gatherer societies and  illustrates that group 
action motivated by moralistic stances frequently motivates the expulsion or assassination of 
dominant individuals, Failure to abide by social rules may lead to exclusions for example and 
Bird-David illustrates that the Nyaka only tolerated a certain amount of egocentric exploitation 
of the sharing rules by one individual before she was conscientiously avoided (Bird-David 
1990; 1992). We can also document the development of social controls in the archaeological 
record of modern human behaviour (table 5) and document social controls on dominance 
within the burial record of Mesolithic Europe (Spikins 2008).  
 
A ‘society of difference’ 
A society made up of ‘different minds’, held together by social processes, is very different 
from one made up of very similar cognitions (fig. 1), and it is argued that it is the development 
of a ‘society of difference’ which marked the emergence of modern human behaviour.  
 
Though autistic minds present their challenges to others, their incorporation into society would 
clearly lead to certain advantages. We might imagine a gradual and progressive adoption of 
social mechanisms to incorporate differences allowing the talents of autistic individuals to be 
exploited in technological/economic changes, with consequences for population dynamics (fig. 
2). Autistic individuals with a focus on technical or natural systems might be valued  




distributions of resources or patterns of animal behaviour. Rigidly analytical thinking (both by 
autistic individuals and through their influence) might improve technology and foraging 
efficiency, leading to reduced foraging stress and greater longevity, and an expansion of the 
resource base carrying the potential for population increase. Autistic and other ‘different’ 
thinking might also play an important role in challenging and expanding the cognitive 
capacities, creativity and innovation of modern human populations. A set of ‘different minds’ 
for example would also give substantial adaptability to environmental changes, with potential 
for important creativity and innovation from those whose ‘difference’ challenged ‘normal’ 
thinking. The development of social mechanisms for integrating ‘different minds’ might also 
have had further effects, perhaps allowing rule based structures to be used in communication 
with distant unrelated groups of people and even with other species of humans met through 
expansion, or allowing other differences to be promoted within society. Incorporation of 
autistic difference might also have other social effects, such as social tensions between 
‘different minds’ and potential leadership roles in extreme stress situations which might have 
played a large role in geographic expansions. 
 
Outside of any potential long term value to society, it may also be possible that changes in 
emotional commitment (Spikins and Rutherford in prep), and a widespread desire to support 
those who might not contribute emotionally to the group, perhaps coupled with cognitive 
abilities through orders of intentionality to believe in common goals (Dunbar 2007) allowed the 
support of autistic people. Whatever the motivations for their adoption the rise of social 
mechanisms for integrating the ‘different mind’ may provide an explanation for the 











Different minds and the emergence of modern human behaviour in the 
archaeological record 
 
Whilst we might view the archaeological evidence for the ‘human revolution’ through the lens 
of autism and conclude that ‘autistic thinking’ played a singularly important role, there is good 
reason to consider the social context in which such thinking might be incorporated.  Given the 
dependence of those with autistic conditions on social mechanisms which foster inclusion in 
the present, a more contextualised perspective would be that social changes, allowing greater 
inclusion of those who are ‘different’, allowed the integration of autistic thinking into society at 
the ‘human revolution’.  
 
It is certainly notable that on a global level the suite of changes associated with modern 
human behaviour ‘map onto’ the development of social mechanisms for inclusion, resultant 
technological and economic changes and population expansion (table 5). Thus we see new 
‘rule based’ means of communication being developed in the form of personal ornamentation 
(explicitly symbolising emotional ties and affiliations). We see potentially early evidence of 
beads in the Near East in the form of two perforated marine shells at Skhul dated to 100-
135kbp (Vanhaeren et al. 2006, D’Errico and Vanhaeren 2007) and selection of shells with 
natural perforations at Quafzeh dated to 100kbp (McBrearty and Brooks 2000, D’Errico and 
Vanhaeren 2007) with the clearest evidence (41 marine shell beads) from Blombos Cave, 
amongst the Still Bay assemblage dated to 75kbp (Henshilwood et al 2004, D’Errico et al 
2005, Zilhao 2007). We also see evidence for the means of cementing social ties across 
communities, such as with the emergence of communal music (Mithen 2005) (with clear 
evidence for musical instruments restricted to a modern human context), and commonly 
understood abstract symbols (such abstract art at Blombos cave dated to 75kbp, D’Errico, 
Henshilwood and Nilssen 2001, Henshilwood et al 2001, 2002). Symbolic communication 
systems also begin to reflect a sense of shared cohesive community with regional styles 
(D’Errico and Vanhaeren 2007).  
 
Such capacities for inclusion not only of autistic individuals, but through their influence 
capacities for analytical ‘autistic thinking’, also match up with resulting technological change 
with modern human behaviour illustrated by precise, standardised and innovative technology 
(such as bladelet technology), engineered to specific needs. Technological innovations also 
include the use of novel materials (eg bone artefacts at Blombos Cave, Henshilwood et al 
2002), the rise of multi-component tools (eg hafted inserts at Klasies River Mouth, Deacon 
and Deacon 1999) and the more elaborate and technological use of fire in hearths (Bar-Yosef 
2002). Economic innovations entailing the use of complex ‘engineered’ technology include the 
emerging exploitation of new marine resources, such as in South Africa at Pinnacle Point 




(Klein 1999). Rigidly structured systems of depiction and notation emerge in Palaeolithic 
notational systems (Marshack 1991, Robinson 1992).  
 
In terms of dealing with the difficulties encountered with ‘difference’ in mind we also see 
emerging spatial differentiation of spheres of activity (in the form of structured differentiated 
domestic deposits at sites, Mellars 1996, Pettit 1997) and in means dealing with serious 
conflicts forcibly (such as the development of projectile technology, Shea 2003: 183, Knecht 
1997, Larsen-Peterken 1993, Bar-Yosef 2002). We also see result of the potential exploitation 
of analytical spatial and memory skills, improved efficiencies in technology and resource 
exploitation and potentially responses to social tensions in corresponding population 
expansion, both geographically and into new habitats (Mellars 2006b, 2007).  
 
The sequence of such changes with the emergence of expansion of modern humans ‘out of 
Africa’ also provides support for the theory. In this context, the earliest evidence for social 
mechanisms for integration in the form of rule based symbolic communication comes from 
South Africa. Here we see early sporadic evidence for symbolism such as with the evidence 
for use of pigment in the Middle Stone Age (Clark et al 2003). At 165,000 (broadly 
contemporary with emerging modern humans) we see use of red ochre which we presume 
carried and codified a clear ‘meaning’ at Pinnacle Point, and in association with this 
technological and subsistence changes in the adoption of marine exploitation patterns and 
exploitation of shellfish (Marean et al 2007). Somewhat later at Blombos Cave at 75,000 – 
80,000 bp, we see more explicitly structured evidence for symbolism, and regular notational 
marks, associated with subsistence changes (Henshilwood et al 2002a, 2002b, 2004) and 
precise, standardised, efficient technology with Howiesons Poort (Wurtz 1999, Henshilwood 
et al 2001). We might interpret this evidence in terms of early signs of social mechanisms for 
integration which might emerge gradually and perhaps sporadically, possibly until pressure to 
formalise such mechanisms leads to sustained adoption.  
 
The spread of modern humans and the sequence of emergence of ‘modern human behaviour’ 
in the Levant supports the scenario of a progressive adoption of social mechanisms and the 
incorporation of different minds. Here social mechanisms for integration in the form of 
evidence for a symbolic burial also occurs early but very sporadically at 130-80kbp associated 
with biologically modern humans and with subtle evidence for more efficient technology (Shea 
2003). However these modern humans with ‘incipient methods of integration’ are displaced by 
Neanderthals in this region at 80kbp (Shea suggests due to Neanderthals advantages in their 
rugged physique and abilities in confrontational hunting). Modern humans only return to 
displace Neanderthals with the formalisation of social mechanisms for integration at 43-30kbp. 
At this date we see widespread symbolic communication, (with the use of red ochre, and 
personal ornamentation) and elaborate burial ritual associated with detailed, efficient, 




that social mechanisms may reach a ‘point of no return’ where rigidly analytical thinking 
(cemented into society through intuitive and emotional support) becomes part and parcel of 
adaptations and ‘autistic thinking’ provides a key role in supporting and maintaining 
technological and subsistence efficiency. 
 
Indeed, following from developments in the Levant, in Europe, modern human behaviour 
appears to be a ‘complete package’. Here we see clear social mechanisms arriving alongside 
the spread of biologically modern humans, particularly in long distance communication and 
exchange (Gamble 1999, Mellars 1996, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006), the use of symbolism in art 
(Mellars 1996, 2000, Stringer and Gamble 1993, Connard and Bolus 2003, Zilhão 2007) and 
structured occupation (Mellars 1996, Pettitt 1997, Bar Yosef 2002, though see also Vaquero 
1999, Vaquero and Pastó 2001, Speth 2006) associated again with evidence for technological 
and subsistence innovations, such as the widespread use of bone and antler technology 
(Stringer and Gamble 1993, Mellars 1996, 2006) and the use of standardised and precisely 
made bladelet technology (Stringer and Gamble 1993, Kuhn and Bietti 2000, Mellars 2006b,c, 
though see also Marks, Hietala and Williams 2001).  
 
The distinctions between modern human and Neanderthal behaviour are however not always 
clear cut. The evidence for burial of the dead by Neanderthals (Harrold 1980, Belfer-Cohen 
1992, Riel-Salvatore & Clark 2001, Pettitt 2002) and for their use of personal ornaments 
(Hublin et al 1996, Mellars 1999, 2004, Harrold and Otte 2001, Otte 2003) suggests a 
sophisticated social life and it can be hard to define a ‘threshold’ separating Neanderthals 
from modern humans. This might be what could be expected if Neanderthals showed some 
level of coding and structuring of meanings, or other social mechanisms which supported at 
least a certain level of ‘difference’. It seems likely that Neanderthals had complex language at 
least (Mithen 2005, Krause et al 2007). The existence of personal ornamentation, such as in 
the Chatelperronian at St Cesaire, might support this interpretation. Nonetheless as we have 
seen Neanderthal society appears to be ‘different’, socially, technologically, economically and 
on the level of population expansion to that of modern humans. It may be that the use of 
personal ornamentation was prompted by interaction with modern humans and demonstrates 
a ‘hi-jacking’ of mechanisms for within species communication in modern humans to that 
between two different species. Equally language and some level of symbolic thought might 
have existed which did not necessarily reach a level or be of a character which might forge 
communication across cognitive differences.  
 
Undoubtedly various issues and questions remain in applying ‘different minds theory’ to the 
archaeological record. The development of social mechanisms including symbolism and the 
emergence of modern human behaviour is yet to be clear in Asia (James and Petraglia 2005) 
for example, and further research clearly remains to be carried out. Nonetheless whilst other 




mutually exclusive), the integration of different minds and the subsequent incorporation of 
particularly autistic talents in society provides a potential important explanation for the 
character, association and timing of the suite of traits associated with ‘modern human 







‘Different minds theory’ remains to be explored in depth. The model (fig. 1) suggests that 
cognitive differences existed prior to the emergence of modern humans, with those with 
autistic minds excluded from society. However in an alternative scenario the autistic spectrum 
of difference might be ‘new’ to the genetic and biological construction of modern humans as a 
species. Autistic talents might provide a new potential which is gradually exploited by modern 
humans. This alternative scenario is difficult to evaluate on the basis of current evidence. 
Theory of Mind is documented in chimpanzees (Dunbar 2003, Tomasello, Call and Hare 2003) 
and recent studies have focused on emotional empathy in other primates (deWaal 2008) 
however the realm of cognitive differences within other primates (and the extent to which this 
is integrated as any social advantage) remains to be explored. Autistic differences may be 
‘new’ to the biology of emergent modern human populations and ‘exploited’ soon after their 
development, or may be an infrequent genetic difference observable in earlier species. 
 
Whilst Baron-Cohen (2001, 2002, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2006b) and others (Nettle 2006a, 
2006b, Crespi 2006) stress autism as a spectrum of differences displayed across the 
population, yet others might maintain that autism is a discrete disorder (Happé and Frith 
2006). In the former case we might imagine that social mechanisms come into play to 
integrate substantially or marginally ‘different’ individuals depending on context. In the latter 
the ‘disorder’ of autism would be maintained through emotional commitments of others and 
social mechanisms for integration, and its elements of autistic genius and a rigid autistic 
approach both provide concrete innovations and an influence on the thinking of others. Whilst 
the author finds the former characterisation of ‘autism’ as a population cline in cognitive 
abilities the more likely, the latter would generate clearly similar behavioural products in the 
archaeological record. Further research might elucidate the issue.  
 
There is also the issue of other differences in ‘mind’. Autism was used as the illustration here, 
and provides a particularly interesting case as there is good evidence that autistic difference 
is a fundamental biological component of human populations. However ‘difference’ can 
constructed in different ways and other biological differences also exist in human populations 
which might have played an equally important role. Nettle and Clegg (2005) highlight the 
importance of schizophrenia which appears to follow a similar pattern of selection and 
maintenance in populations as autism. Whilst certain expressions of genes for schizophrenia 
can be very disadvantageous, at a lower expression they can confer positive advantages in 
terms of creativity. Schizophrenia, like autism, is also tempered or effected by environment 
and may only be expressed or diagnosed as ‘disorder’ under certain conditions. The selection 
and incorporation of schizophrenia/creativity might also have been an importance element of 





Other biological differences might also be described or researched. Baron-Cohen and Dunbar 
both stress the emergence of a few potentially significant individuals with extraordinary social 
skills (and potentially limited technological capacities) in human evolution. Dunbar related 
those with ‘higher order intentionality’ to roles as ritual leaders, whilst Baron-Cohen relates 
those with ‘extreme empathy’ to roles in caring situations such as psychotherapists and 
nurses (Baron-Cohen 2004). These individuals might play a key role in facilitating group 
action non-coersively, as we know to be the norm in ethnographically documented small scale 
hunter-gatherer groups (Boehm 1993; 1999). We might consider that such individuals may 
have played an important role in social cohesion and the integration of different minds.  
 
Difference may also have been important in modern human behaviour in ways that were 
almost exclusively social. Although there is evidence for modern sex differences in mind 
particularly in verbal and spatial reasoning (Halpern 1992, Connellan et al 2001, Baron-Cohen 
2002, 2004, 2006c, Nettle 2006a) and some authors would see such differences as the 
‘middle ground’ of the autistic spectrum (Baron-Cohen 2002, 2004, Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright 2004) gender based social roles seem to be largely culturally constructed. 
Gender roles and the sexual division of labour might have been a difference particular to 
modern humans and significant in their relative success and expansion nonetheless (Balme 
and Bowdler 2006), perhaps even exploiting concepts of specialised spheres and roles 
developed through integration of autism or other extremes of ‘difference’. 
 
Other ‘differences’ may also contribute to personalities, social roles and humans as a highly 
polymorphic, adaptable species and society in other ways. Depression (Murphy and Stich 
2000), different attachment styles (Goleman 2006 Mikulincer and Shaver 2005, Mikulincer et 
al 2005) or other effects of childhood experiences (Bateson and Martin 2000) may also lead 
to the development of different social roles. Both the active construction, as well as the 
integration of cognitive ‘difference’ may have been a distinctive part of ‘modern human 
behaviour’.  Further research into the genetic and social construction, incorporation and 








‘Difference’ in mind may have been particularly significant in the emergence of modern 
human behaviour. Yet ‘difference’ can also be difficult to discuss or approach. Our attitudes to 
‘difference’ pervade our understanding of who we are, and of where we come from, including 
our understanding of our own evolution and early prehistory. Differences between ourselves 
and others can seem threatening to our sense of self, or even dangerous in their 
unpredictability.  
 
It is notable that one of the most enduring images in discussions of early humans has been 
Carleton Coon’s depiction of a Neanderthal wearing a suit and hat (fig. 3), supposedly 
unnoticeable in a New York subway (Coon 1939, Stringer and Gamble 1993: 28). On one 
level this depiction simply illustrates that morphological differences between modern humans 
and Neanderthals, particularly the pronounced brow ridge of Neanderthals, could easily be 
disguised. On another however the image implies that if Neanderthals could wield the social 
mechanisms of society to allow their integration even marked differences, physically or 
cognitively, might be unproblematic. The image stands well beyond Coon’s interpretations of 
races, to mean something quite different – it reminds us quite profoundly that as long as the 
social rules are followed even a Neanderthal might find a place in society. Often it is these 
rules and structures to relationships with others which allay our fears of what difference might 
engender and support our sympathies and tendencies to social inclusion.  In showing a 
Neanderthal as suited and ‘social’, that is aware of the social rules and norms of interaction, 
Coon makes even a different species of human, separated by hundreds of thousands of years 
of evolution, familiar and approachable.  
 
Cognitive differences within our own species, particularly those which characterise the 
‘autistic spectrum’, are far from insignificant. Yet, whatever our own place on the autistic 
spectrum, we all use and find familiar such social mechanisms to communicate with those 
around us who may be cognitively very different from ourselves. It is argued here that the 
existence and incorporation of such difference (and potentially others) may have been a 
crucial part of modern human success. Indeed, it may not have been one ‘modern human 
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Table 1. Archaeological traits of ‘modern human behaviour’ (after Hensilwood and 
Marean 2003, McBrearty and Brooks 2000, Bar-Yosef 2002, Mellars, 2005; 2006) 
 
Social structures and communication mechanisms 
Long-distance exchange networks  
Personal ornamentation  
Symbolic expression and use of pigment  
Notched and incised objects (bone, egg shell, ochre, stone) 
Burials with grave goods, ochre, ritual objects  
 
Technological changes in terms of adoption of innovative technology, standardisation, 
and precision in technical artefacts 
New lithic technologies  
‘Improved’ (more efficient) technology  
Standardisation with formal tool categories  
Complex tool designs eg Hafting and composite tools  
Tools in novel materials eg bone, antler  
Special purpose tools eg projectiles, geometrics  
Increased number of tool categories 
 
Subsistence changes, particularly with innovative and structured/standardised 
exploitation patterns 
Increased diet breadth 
Specialised hunting of large, dangerous animals 
Scheduling and seasonality in resource exploitation 
More efficient foraging strategies  
Intensification of resource extraction (aquatic and vegetable) 
 
Population dynamics  
Increased population densities 
Range of previously unoccupied regions  
Geographic variation in formal categories 
Temporal variation in formal categories 
Long distance procurement and exchange of raw materials  
Curation of exotic raw materials 
Site reoccupation or longer occupation  
Structured use of domestic space 





Table 2. Diagnostic Criteria for 299.80 Asperger's Disorder 
[The following is from American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders: DSM IV] 
(I) Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:  
(A) marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, 
facial expression, body posture, and gestures to regulate social interaction 
(B) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level 
(C) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interest or achievements with other 
people, (e.g.. by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest to other 
people) 
(D) lack of social or emotional reciprocity 
 
(II) Restricted repetitive & stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities, as manifested by 
at least one of the following: 
(A) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of 
interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus 
(B) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals 
(C) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g. hand or finger flapping or twisting, or 
complex whole-body movements) 
(D) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
 
(III) The disturbance causes clinically significant impairments in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning. 
 
(IV) There is no clinically significant general delay in language (E.G. single words used by age 2 
years, communicative phrases used by age 3 years) 
 
(V) There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development or in the development of age-
appropriate self help skills, adaptive behavior (other than in social interaction) and curiosity about the 
environment in childhood. 
 





Table 3. Diagnostic Criteria for 299.00 Autistic Disorder 
[The following is from American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders: DSM IV] 
(I) A total of six (or more) items from (A), (B), and (C), with at least two from (A), and one each from 
(B) and (C) 
(A) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following: 
1. marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-
eye gaze, facial expression, body posture, and gestures to regulate social 
interaction 
2. failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level 
3. a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements 
with other people, (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of 
interest to other people)  
4. lack of social or emotional reciprocity ( note: in the description, it gives the 
following as examples: not actively participating in simple social play or games, 
preferring solitary activities, or involving others in activities only as tools or 
"mechanical" aids ) 
 
(B) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the following:  
1. delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not accompanied 
by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of communication such as 
gesture or mime) 
2. in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to initiate or 
sustain a conversation with others 
3. stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language 
4. lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play appropriate 
to developmental level 
 
(C) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities, as 
manifested by at least two of the following:  
1. encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted 
patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus 
2. apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals 
3. stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g hand or finger flapping or 
twisting, or complex whole-body movements) 
4. persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
 
(II) Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior to age 3 
years:  
(A) social interaction 
(B) language as used in social communication 
(C) symbolic or imaginative play 
 






Table 4. Characteristics of autistic conditions of particular significance for social roles 




A particular focus on detail (O’Riordan et al 2001, Plaisted et al 1998, Baron Cohen 2006a, 
2006b) and abilities to differentiate details within large patterns (‘weak central coherence’ 
Frith and Happe 1994, Shah 1988) 
 
Sometimes exceptional memory capacities (Attwood 1998) 
 
Literal, rule based understanding (Selfe 1983; Humphrey 1998; Myers et al 2004) of the world, 
ability to isolate rules and pattern within complex systems (eg engineering or weather patterns, 
Hermelin 2002, Baron-Cohen et al 2000) 
 
‘Obsessive’ focus on their area of interest (Attwood 1998:15; Ehlers and Gillberg 1993; 




Due to deficits in empathy (Attwood 1998:15), particular focus on psychological rewards in 
other realms than social relationships (Wing 1981; Fitzgerald 2004)) 
 
Focus on acquiring knowledge about the natural and physical world (Krevelen and Kuipers 
1962; Fitzgerald 2004) 
 
Tendency to social isolation, lack of desire to interact with others (Szatmari et al 1989; 
Attwood 1998: 25) 
 
Effects on Others 
 
Lack of concern/understanding of social norms (Wing 1981; Attwood 1998; Fitzgerald 2004)  
 
Abilities to develop unique insights (Baron-Cohen 2006b: 4) 
 
Desire to create predictable environments and controllable systems (extending to people) 
(Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004: 253; Attwood 1998) 
 
Misreading of emotional messages, challenges with understanding and communication 
(Attwood 1998: 25) 
 
Lack of self-doubt, tendency to attempt to force own viewpoint and so create social tensions 
or be controlling or emotionally damaging (Attwood 1998:25; Fitzgerald 2004: 31; Baron-
Cohen 2006c) 
 
Lack of concern for or action on behalf of others, particularly where there are no rules to 




Table 5: Archaeological evidence corresponding to key traits illustrating the integration of autistic minds within society 
 
Integration of autistic individuals and 
autistic thinking into society 
Archaeological expression (in ‘modern human 
behaviour’) 
Archaeological examples  
   
Mechanisms for integrating ‘different minds’:   
Material symbolism of complex emotional 
ties 






Appearance of body decorations such as 
shell beads (eg in the Levant, Kuhn et al 
2001, or at Blombos Cave, Henshilwood 
2004, or in the European Aurignacian 
White 1993, 1997)  
 
Burials with grave goods, ochre and ritual 
objects (eg in the Levant at Quafzeh 
Cave, 90,000 years ago, Hovers et al. 
2003) 
Clear material clues of meanings Use of symbolism Use of red ochre (eg at Blombos cave, 
Hensilwood 2002 or at Pinnacle Point, 
Marean et al 2007) 
Mechanisms for clear 
communication/collaboration across different 
understandings and perceptions (eg ‘tit-for-
tat’ social structures) 
Long distance communication with other groups Exchange of Venus figurines (eg of Venus 
figures in Europe, Gamble 1999) 
Long distance raw material movement (eg 
in South West Europe, Gamble 1999. 
Marwick 2003) 
Mechanisms for dealing with social tensions  Evidence for social rituals and collaborative practices 
(music, dance, shamanism) 
 
 
Organised use of space  
 
Evidence for music (eg Mithen 2005) and 
shamanic practices (eg Lewis Williams 
2002) 
 
Widespread distinct spatial organisation 
(Pettitt 1997, Mellars 1996, though see 
also Vaquero 1999, Vaquero and Pastó 
2001, Speth 2006), widespread structured 
hearths (Bar-Yosef 2002)  
Mechanisms for dealing with controlling, 
emotionally damaging or dominant behaviour 
Mechanisms to counteract dominance  projectile technology such as spear 




distance combat possibilities, Shea 2003)  
 
group unity, moral emotions and group 
expulsions or assassinations (Boehm 
1993, 1999) 
   
Social roles for individuals with autistic 
talents 
  
Inclusion of individuals with unique 
capacities for understanding physical and 
mechanical systems 














More complex technological designs 
Bladelets, microliths and backing (eg 
Howiesons Poort technology, Mellars 
2005: 17, Aurignacian bladelets in Europe 
Mellars 2006c)  
More efficient blade technology (eg 75,00-
80,000 in the Levant, Shea 2003) 
 
Diversified projectile points (eg in the 
Levant and Europe, Shea 2003: 183, 
Knecht 1997, Larsen-Peterken 1993, Bar-
Yosef 2002) 
 
Use of novel materials (eg bone artefacts 
at Blombos Cave, Henshilwood et al 
2002) 
 
Rise of multi-component tools (eg hafted 
inserts at Klasies River Mouth, Deacon 
and Deacon 1999) 
 
More elaborate and technological use of 
fire in hearths (Bar-Yosef 2002 ) 
 
Use of grinding and pounding stones 
(Wright 1992, Bar-Yosef 2002) 
Inclusion of individuals with unique 
capacities for understanding natural systems 
More efficient exploitation patterns 
 
More efficient scheduling of exploitation 















Exploitation of new environments  
patterns in the Levant, Lieberman and 
Shea 1994) 
 
Regular exploitation of more dangerous 
species (eg Cape buffalo and bushpigs at 
MSA sites in south Africa, Klein 1999) 
 
Development of marine exploitation (eg of 
shellfish at Pinnacle Point, Marean et al 
2007) 
 
Population regional expansion (eg into 
Europe, Mellars 2006b) and into more 
inhospitable environments (Finlayson 
2004) 
Inclusion of individuals with concern with 
small precise details 
 
Precise and detailed technological innovations  Precise, detailed designs (eg Howiesons 
Poort industry, Mellars 2005, Aurignacian 
bladelets Mellars 2006c) 
Inclusion of individuals with concern for 
‘rules’ 




Special purpose tools  
Formalised tool types (eg formalised end 
scrapers at Klasies River Mouth, Singer 
and Wymer 1983) 
 
Eg defined, specific forms (eg new end 
scraper forms, Klasies River Mouth, 
Singer and Wymer 1983, Mellars 2005) 
Individuals with lack of understanding of 
social norms 
Innovative technological or subsistence methods 
 
Innovative categories of subsistence 
resources (eg of shellfish at Pinnacle 
Point, Marean et al 2007) 
   
Population consequences of integrating 
autistic minds 
  
Individuals often desiring isolation, and with 
unique memory capacities  
Population expansion, as new lands can be mapped 
by exploration (refs Mellars 2006) 
Genetic evidence for population 
expansion (Mellars 2006b) 
Social conflicts Splits in populations Regionally differentiated tools (eg in the 




Mellars 1989, Gamble 1999, appearances 
of differences in style, Bar-Yosef 2002) 
Biological consequences of increased 
efficiency in resource exploitation 
Increased longevity 
 
Reduced trauma through foraging stress on limbs 
Caspari and Lee (2006) 
 
Davies and Underdown (2006) 
Underdown (2006) 
 
 
 
